There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and action. 
Apart from that, it is argued that the prohibition serves 'a pressing social purpose'
and it would contradict international obligations to allow such an exemption. At this point the question arose how much consideration was given to values and the actual rights of the individual, and it is curious that the word 'values' is not used even once throughout the whole judgment. Much is made of the vertical relationship, the difficulty of implementing a permit system and policing it, as well as the power of the legislature and the duty to sanction inconsistent conduct. The question therefore arises whether this judgment in fact engages with substantive reasoning whatsoever, and whether it's possible that a legal positivistic approach wasn't followed, which is quite unable to find a place for 'values' within its improvised methodology. 
52/173
Ngcobo considers the central role of religion in the appellant's overall activities, even though it may strike other as "bizarre, illogical or irrational". A he point out that "the protection of diversity is the hallmark of a free and open society"[49] and the word "values" is used no less than 9 times throughout the judgment. He argues, on behalf of the minority, that the means employed to achieve the goal is unreasonable and does constitute an unreasonable infringement on the right of religious freedom, as guaranteed in the constitution. The fact is posed that the faithful are being forced to choose between following their religion or complying with the law. After a balancing of public and community interest, it is concluded that it is the duty of the legislature to make provisions for such exemption and the administering of it.
Ngcobo, in my opinion, engages in substantive reasoning, by following a realist-cum-liberal-cum-africanist approach:
Liberal in the sense that the individual's rights are recognised and an exemption proposed, but weighed up against public interest and the integrity of the law.
Rules, principles and policy apply, and the purpose of the legislature is regarded important.
Africanist in the sense that the history of the use of cannabis and origin of the religion as black consciousness movement seeking to overthrow colonialism and white oppression, is regarded, but also in the effort to permit other cultures a harmonious entrance into South African law.
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Realist in the sense that a "subjective, intuitive and creative" role is ascribed to the judge 17 in applying a balancing of rights and values against the social background and history.
Sachs, for the minority, strongly emphasises, even pleads, for tolerance towards multiculturalism and religious diversity, as well as a sensitivity towards marginalized, vulnerable and stigmatised groups. He opposes rigid mainstream norms which "put believers to extremely painful and intensely burdensome choices of either being true to their faith or else respectful of the law".
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In concluding his argument it is stated that the failure of the legislature to acknowledge and accommodate religious diversity, will not always survive constitutional scrutiny, since there is, according to 53/173 the Court, a 'right to be different'. The word "values" is used once throughout the judment, and in my view, this judgment effectively engages with substantive reasoning by regarding values in a plural society.
As a scholar of the Critical Legal Studies movement, he wishes to show that if legal consciousness -the belief in the inevitability of a status quo which favours some groups and some visions over others -can be changed, then society itself can be changed. Law is politics. According to Sachs, the interpretation of the notion of reasonableness according to Western standards is inappropriate in a plural society such as South Africa.
CONCLUSION
Much is still to be said of 'subjective' and 'objective' reasons for decisions, as well as the wedge between 'legal reasoning' and 'moral and political reasoning', but from this brief assessment it is clear that it is inevitable for the Constitutional Court to engage in moral and political reasoning in order to fully embrace the substantive vision of law in matters pertaining to the interpretation to the Bill of Rights. This will require the construction of a rationally defensible moral and political viewpoint, even though adjudicators will frequently be unable to escape making difficult value judgments, where logic and precedent are of limited assistance. 
